The research
Russian cultural diplomacy in Germany: actors, narratives, and achievements
Дата
Authors
Mariia Protsiuk, Anna Prokhorova, Mariia Dubyk
About the research
The research aims to analyse the activities of state and non-state actors of Russian cultural diplomacy in Germany, their relations, network, and peculiarities of functioning over the last two decades.
The research “Russian cultural diplomacy in Germany: actors, narratives, and achievements” continues the series of studies of the cultural diplomacy institutions of the Russian Federation, which the Ukrainian Institute started in 2022.
Conducted by the analytical team of the Ukrainian Institute with the financial support of Open Society Foundations and organisational help from Goethe-Institut within the project “Enhancing the Ukraine-Germany cultural dialogue 2022-2023”.
The study’s main conclusions
The network of state institutions and non-state organisations, which can directly or indirectly be considered as actors of Russian cultural diplomacy in Germany, is deep, extensive, and interpenetrating.
On the surface level, the limited network of state entities involved in Russian cultural diplomacy in Germany seems to be overwhelmed by the efforts of the Rossotrudnichestvo (which includes the Russian House in Berlin), the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation, and its associated offices and centres, as well as diplomatic institutions that steer the cultural agenda of their initiatives. However, a closer look reveals dozens of smaller organisations that cooperate with state actors and are influenced by the official cultural diplomacy of the Russian Federation in Germany. This influence is manifested through joint events, financial assistance, or the propagation of identical narratives in alignment with the Kremlin. Thus, they become GONGOs under the Rossotrudnichestvo or the “Russkiy Mir” Foundation.
Since formally such organisations remain NGOs, they are eligible to apply for German funding (both state and from a number of private funds), which additionally legitimises them as representatives of civil society and supposedly autonomous in their operations. Moreover, bilateral German-Russian organisations, forums, museums, or analytical centres, as well as a wide range of non-institutional practices are evident.
Russia’s cultural diplomacy mimics and adapts to the prevailing political realities in the international arena, caused by its own rapacious and aggressive actions. In this context, after February 24, 2022, cooperation with Russian state actors took on a negative tone, even for German society, which had previously been receptive to cooperation with Moscow. However, the Russian Federation continues to actively instrumentalise culture to achieve its foreign policy goals and justify a war of aggression against Ukraine.